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The thesis consists of three chapters in public economics. In the first two
chapters, we develop theoretical models to show how citizens’ tax evasion and
the governor’s embezzlement affect public good provision. In the third chapter,
I design an experiment to see how position uncertainty in a sequential public
goods game affects contribution levels.
In the first chapter, we consider a model that links tax evasion, corruption,
and public good provision. In our model, citizens pay or evade taxes into the
public fund, which a corrupt governor redistributes. Each citizen forms expec-
tations about the amount of public goods the governor should provide. After ob-
serving the actual level of public goods, a citizen punishes the governor if this
level is below his expectations. We describe three types of equilibria: tax eva-
sion, efficient public good provision, and symmetric mixed-strategy. We show
that the highest expectations can lead to no free-riding (tax evasion) and the effi-
cient level of public good provision even with the corrupt governor and without
punishment for tax evasion.
The second chapter complements the first chapter by relaxing the assump-
tion of symmetric strategy. In this chapter, we consider a model with two citi-
zens and a governor. First, the citizens decide whether to pay tax or evade. Then,
Nature (an independent tax authority) audits one of the citizens randomly, and
in case of non-payment, the citizen is fined and are forced to pay the tax. Third,
the governor receives the taxes and decides how much public good to provide.
Finally, after the governor’s decisions, citizens observe the amount of public
good provided and express their opinion on whether the governor embezzled
from the public fund or not. More specifically, the citizens guess the correct
number of units in the public fund. We formulate this in a four-stage extensive
form game. We characterise the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of this game. Our
main result shows that any strategy profile can be a Nash equilibrium for the
ii
right choice of the parameter. This suggests that, as a society, we could reach a
particular set of outcomes if we set specific restrictions on the parameters (for
example, we can set parameters such that there is no tax evasion). By assuming
that citizens care about their guesses (i.e. opinions) we can refine our Nash pre-
dictions. This gives us three different types of Nash equilibrium. First, we show
that if the penalty for evading tax is too low, then both citizens have an incentive
to evade tax. Then, we show that if the penalty for evading tax is high enough,
and the penalty for embezzlement is low then at least one of the citizens pays
tax and the governor embezzles whenever he has the opportunity to do so. Fi-
nally, we show that if the penalty for both embezzlement and tax evasion is high
enough, we will have efficient public good provision, meaning all citizens pay
tax and the governor uses the entire fund to provide the public good.
Finally, in the third chapter, I design an experiment to see how position
uncertainty in a sequential public goods game affects the level of the contri-
butions. Theory suggests that in a one-shot game among a finite number of
self-interested individuals, full cooperation is sustainable (Gallice & Monzón,
2019). This prediction is completely different from the previous theoretical pre-
dictions. The experiment consists of two treatments. The first treatment is a
sequential public goods game. The second treatment is the game with position
uncertainty. The results show that the contributions, at the group level, in each
treatment are statistically different.
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Public Good Provision : A Tale of Tax
Evasion and Corruption
1.1 Introduction
Tax is a mandatory financial charge levied upon citizens to fund public expen-
ditures including the provision of public goods. A citizen’s decision of whether
or not to pay taxes not only depends on monetary reasons, but also on sev-
eral non-monetary factors. These include social norms, peer pressure, trust in
government and political corruption. In most societies, elected political lead-
ers (mayors, governors, etc.) control the public funds and decide how to re-
distribute them. Empirical evidence shows that political corruption (such as
embezzlement of public funds by governmental officials for private gain) ex-
ists both in developed and developing countries, see, for example, Costas-Pérez
et al. (2012), Ferraz and Finan (2008), Reinikka and Svensson (2004). However,
there is a surprising lack of study on the connections among tax evasion, polit-
ical corruption, and public good provision.
In this chapter, we develop a theoretical model to show how citizens’ tax
evasion and the governor’s embezzlement affect public good provision. The
main problem of public good provision is free riding. In our model, each cit-
izen decides whether to evade taxes and free ride on public goods or not. The
governor collects taxes in the public fund and decides how to allocate it. The
governor is corrupt and behaves in her own self interests: she embezzles pub-
lic funds if her benefits outweigh her costs. Even though the free rider problem
is magnified by the corrupt governor in our model, we show that this governor
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in fact helps to obtain the efficient public good provision even without punish-
ments for tax evasion.
There are two types of punishments in the model. First, each citizen can
be punished for the tax evasion with a positive probability. Tax authorities can
only monitor a certain fraction of citizens and so this probability is typically less
than one. Moreover, each citizen forms expectations about public good pro-
vision and if the actual provision is below these expectations, then the citizen
punishes the governor. Empirical evidence shows that indeed citizens tend to
punish by not re-electing corrupt politicians, see, for example Ferraz and Finan
(2011), Welch and Hibbing (1997).
We obtain three main results in the model. First, the efficient public good
provision equilibrium is characterized. We show that if the punishment for em-
bezzlement of public funds is high enough, then there exists an equilibrium
where all citizens pay taxes and expect the efficient public good provision from
the governor. If this provision is not provided by the governor, then all citizens
punish her. This leads to a situation where the governor either provides the ef-
ficient level of public goods if she collects enough funds or she embezzles all
public funds because she is punished for all other levels of public good provi-
sion. In this situation each citizen is pivotal for public good provision and the
efficient level of public good provision can be achieved without punishment for
tax evasion.
Note that citizens’ expectations of the public good provision are a measure
of accountability for the elected politician (the governor in our model), and so
these expectations can prevent embezzling of public funds. Accountability has
been widely studied in political science and political economy literature (see, for
example, Duggan and Martinelli (2017), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Persson et al.
(1997)) with the emphasis on elections and organizational structures. Instead of
focusing on political accountability, in this chapter, we focus on social account-
ability. According to the World Bank, “while the concept of social accountabil-
ity remains contested, it can broadly be understood as a range of actions and
strategies beyond voting, that societal actors – namely the citizens – employ to
hold the state to account” (O’Meally, 2013). Citizens could use a multitude of so-
cial accountability mechanisms to put pressure and hold public officials or/and
1.1. Introduction 3
elected politician accountable. When citizens perceive their rights to be vio-
lated and/or there are inadequate goods and services provided, they challenge
the government. Some examples of social accountability measures include the
monitoring and oversight of public sector performance, protesting, complaints
and claim-making.1 For example, India has a long history of the formal mech-
anism of complaint and claim-making called “grievance redress mechanism”
(Auerbach & Kruks-Wisner, 2020; Post & Agarwal, 2011). The central idea of the
mechanism is that in the case that the citizens’ expectations for a certain level of
public goods or services are not met, the citizens can complain to a government
agency and hold the officials accountable. The officials concerned are required
to respond to such a complaint. This further encourages citizens to make offi-
cial complaints, which creates a positive feedback loop.
Second, as in any public good game, the tax evasion equilibrium is char-
acterized. We show that if the punishment for tax evasion is relatively small,
then all citizens can evade taxes and expect the minimal level of the public good
provision from the governor, who in turn always provides the minimal level of
public goods. Note that the citizens’ expectations are always correct and self-
enforced in this equilibrium.
Finally, we show that for any citizens’ expectations, there always exists a
(mixed-strategy) equilibrium, where the governor matches these expectations:
she either provides exactly the expected level of public good if she collects enough
funds or embezzles all public funds if she does not collect enough funds to match
the expectations.
There is a lot of literature on tax evasion, embezzlement, and public goods.
Each topic deserves its own special attention. Allingham and Sandmo (1972), in
their seminal paper, analyze an individual taxpayer’s decision. The individual
decides how much of their income to declare to the tax authority with a given
tax rate and a fixed probability of audit. Since then, the literature on tax evasion
has expanded. See Slemrod (1985), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), and Alm (2019)
for a review of the tax evasion literature.
Corruption and embezzlement are extensively studied both by economists
and political scientists. See, for example, Ades and Di Tella (1999), Brollo et al.
1See Fox (2015) for a meta-analysis on social accountability.
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(2013), Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017), Welch and Hibbing (1997), where cor-
rupt behavior of a ruler is punished by individual population members via elec-
tions.
The literature on public goods started from Samuelson (1954). See also
Chaudhuri (2011), Ledyard (1995) for reviews. The recent work is focused on im-
proving the mechanism of redistributing public funds and decreasing the free
rider problem. A peer punishment (i.e. decentralised or informal punishment),
see Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), as well as, a central sanction mechanism, see
Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996), Baldassarri and Grossman (2012), Markussen
et al. (2014, 2016), have been used to tackle the free rider problem.
Even though the literature on tax evasion, corruption and public good pro-
vision is vast, only a handful of papers look into the interplay between them.
Lambert-Mogiliansky (2015) links public good provision, corruption and social
accountability by considering a model where a public official allocates a budget
for public goods and services, and the official has to provide evidence that she
deserves to be reappointed, or else she will be suspected of embezzlement. In
this chapter, we use citizens’ complaints as a social accountability mechanism.2
Another related work that connects public good provision, corruption and (po-
litical) accountability is Van Weelden (2013), where an infinitely repeated citizen-
candidate model of political competition is used to study the corrupt behavior
of the elected politician. The elected candidate chooses the policy to implement
and how much to embezzle when in office. The voter decides which candidate
to elect and, subsequently, whether the candidate should be retained. Our focus
in this chapter is on social accountability.
Litina and Palivos (2016) link embezzlement and tax evasion via a theoret-
ical framework consisting of an overlapping generation of citizens and politi-
cians, where a fraction of the population emerges as politicians through a ran-
dom process. The model uses social stigma as a way to deter corrupt behaviour.
In our model, citizens live for the entire game (i.e. no overlapping generation
of citizens) and the governor is distinct from the citizens. More importantly, we
2See Bobonis et al. (2016), Avis et al. (2018), Campante and Do (2014), Ortner and Chassang
(2018) for some recent literature on various other accountability mechanisms for reducing cor-
ruption.
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focus on deterrence policies like the enforcement mechanisms for both citizens
(penalty for tax evasion) and politicians (citizens’ complaints).
The outline of the chapter is as follows: Section 1.2 describes our model.
Section 1.3 presents the analysis of the model that includes the main results, a
discussion of these results. We conclude in Section 1.4.
1.2 Model
We consider a four-stage sequential-move game involving N = {1, 2, 3, .., n} citi-
zens and a governor, G . First, citizens decide whether or not to pay taxes. Then,
Nature - an independent tax agency, like IRS in the USA or HMRC in UK, which
acts as a non-strategic player of the game - selects k ≤ n citizens to audit at
random. If the audited citizen did not pay tax, then he has to pay it and is also
penalized. The total tax collected goes into a public fund which the governor re-
distributes in the form of public goods. The governor keeps (embezzles) what-
ever is left in the public fund after the redistribution. Finally, citizens voice their
opinion about the governor by punishing the latter in the case of lower provi-
sion of public goods than what they expected. We will formally describe the
game now.
Stage 1
Each citizen i ∈ N simultaneously chooses an action ti , where ti = 0 (= 1) im-
plies tax evasion (tax payment). We assume that the tax is 1 unit for each citizen
and the total tax collected goes towards the public fund.
Stage 2
Nature randomly selects k (out of n) citizens to audit, and we assume




If a non-tax paying citizen is audited, he will need to pay 1 unit of tax and a
penalty for tax evasion, z , where z ≥ 0. Taxes and penalties go to the ‘Consol-
idated Fund Account’, out of which total penalty pays for supply services, i.e.
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payments issued to government departments, like IRS and HMRC, to finance
their expenditure, and taxes go towards the public fund.3
Stage 3
The governor receives total public funds X ∈ {k , k +1, ..., n}. If all citizens evade
taxes, the governor receives X = k units of the public fund, while the maximum
amount of the public fund available to the governor is X = n (for example if all
citizens pay taxes).
The governor can choose to redistribute any amount, g ≤ X , from the pub-
lic fund. In this case, each citizen receives a g and the governor gets a g +(X −g ),
where 0 < a < 1 is the marginal per capita return from the public good. We as-
sume that the governor also benefits from the public good provision.
Stage 4
In the final stage of the game, we model a proxy for voting, where each citizen
i forms expectations, τi ∈ {k , k +1, ..., n}, of the total public fund X available to
the governor. Citizens observe the level of public good, g , being provided by the
governor, and in the case g < τi , citizen i punishes the governor by b ≥ 0 for
not meeting his expectations, in other words, the governor loses the confidence
of her citizens. We assume that citizens care about having the right expecta-
tions and putting across their opinion in the case when their expectations are
not met. We assume that a citizen i gets some disutility ifτi > g and he does not
complain. This assumption means that each citizen has a dominant action at
stage 4. Our results also hold if we assume that only a particular share of citizens














3See, for example, page 2 of Treasury (2018).
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We can describe the payoffs of all players after stage 4 now. Citizen i re-
ceives
ui ((1,τi ), ...; g ) = a g −1,
where the citizen paid tax, the governor provided g units of public goods, and
citizen i expected τi units of public goods from the governor. Analogously, cit-
izen i receives




a g , if i was not audited,
a g −1− z , if i was audited,
where the citizen evaded tax, the governor provided g units of public goods, and
citizen i expected τi units of public goods from the governor.
Utility for the governor is
uG ((1,τ1), ..., (0,τn ); g ) = X − g +a g − [#complaints]b ,
where the total public fund is X , the governor provided g units of public goods,
citizen i expectedτi units of public goods from the governor, and [#complaints]
is the number of citizens whose public good expectations are above g .
1.3 Analysis
Citizens and the governor have many pure strategies in the model. However, it is
enough to consider only particular strategies to obtain our main results. So, we
will restrict our attention to symmetric pure strategies for citizens and cut-off
strategies for the governor.
Symmetric pure strategies (1,τ)and (0,τ) specify whether citizens pay taxes,
1, or not, 0, and τ describes their public good provision expectations. Since citi-
zens have the dominant action at stage 4, they complain ifτ> g and they do not
complain if τ ≤ g . We will also consider symmetric mixed strategies σ = (p ,τ)
where citizens randomize over the first stage actions, pay taxes with probability
p , and expect τ units of public goods.
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A cutoff strategy 〈g 〉 means that the governor redistributes exactly g ≥ 0
units if the total collected public fund is at or above this cutoff level, or g ≤ X .
Otherwise, no public good is produced. Note that the governor, who uses the
cutoff strategy, embezzles public funds more often than not. For example, she
plunders whatever is left in the public fund after the cutoff level is satisfied. It is
even more striking that we obtain our results with a corrupt governor.
We will be looking for symmetric (pure and mixed) equilibria in this sec-
tion. Our results take into account an important element of the model – citi-
zens’ expectations, τ. In the next Lemma 1, we characterize these expectations,
assuming that citizens are rational.
LEMMA 1.1. Suppose that there are n citizens and k of them are audited. If each
citizen pays 1 unit tax with probability p at stage 1, then the expected number of
units, τ, that the governor collects is
τ= k +p (n −k ). (1.1)
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Let j denote the number of citizens paying tax. Let ks de-
note the number of successful audits. Let K be a random variable whose out-
come is ks . Here K follows a hyper-geometric distribution whose probability
mass function (p.m.f) is given by








































































































We apply absorption identity (Graham et al., 1994, p. 157) on the last term of
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p j−1(1−p )n− j
= np +k −k p
= k +p (n −k ) (1.5)
Next, we analyze three situations. First, we consider efficient public good
provision, where each citizen pays the tax, p = 1, and expects, from Lemma 1,
τ = n units of public goods from the governor, who provides exactly n units in
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the equilibrium. The second situation we look at is a tax evasion equilibrium,
where each citizen does not pay the tax, p = 0, and expects, from Lemma 1,
τ= k units of public good from the governor, who indeed provides k units in the
equilibrium. In order to give a flavor of these results, we consider an example
describing these two extreme cases in the next subsection 1.3.1.
Finally, we analyze a situation when each citizen pays the tax with probabil-
ity p and expects, from Lemma 1,τunits of public goods from the governor, who
provides eitherτunits, if she collects enough taxes, or 0 units, if she receives less
than τ units in taxes. We illustrate this result in subsection 1.3.4.
Our results depend on the four parameters of the model: marginal per capita
return a , punishment for embezzlement b , penalty for tax evasion z , and citi-
zens’ expectations about the public fund, τ.
1.3.1 An example
In this section, we present an example that illustrates our two main findings.
Suppose that there are n = 3 citizens and one of them is audited at random,
k = 1. We also assume that a = 34 , b =
1
2 , and z = 1.
Efficient public good provision
Consider a situation when each citizen pays t = 1 unit tax, or p = 1, and expects,
from Lemma 1, τ = 3 units of public good from the governor, or plays strategy






0, if X < 3,
3, if X = 3,
where the total collected public fund is X , and if it is at the cutoff level, 3, then
the governor produces exactly 3 units of public goods. Otherwise, no public
good is produced.
We claim that a symmetric strategy profile ((1, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈3〉) is a Nash
equilibrium. Let us verify that. Note that the expected utility of citizen i is





and the expected governor’s utility is




For the strategy profile ((1, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈3〉) to be a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium, it should be mutual best responses for the players to play the strategy pre-
scribed in the profile. The best possible deviation for the governor is to embezzle
all units from the public fund, which gives the following expected utility:
E uG ((1, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈0〉) = 3−3b =
3
2
< E uG ((1, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈3〉).
The best possible deviation for citizen i = 1 is to evade taxes, and the corre-
sponding expected utility is
E ui ((0, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈3〉) =
1
3






< E u1((1, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈3〉).
Note that if citizen i = 1 evades the tax and is not audited, the governor gets
only 2 units in taxes and, therefore, embezzles these 2 units, because she will
be punished for not providing 3 units of the public good by two other citizens
who expect three units of public goods. Thus, given our parameter values, the
strategy profile ((1, 3), (1, 3), (1, 3); 〈3〉) is a Nash equilibrium. We generalize this
result in Theorem 1 (see subsection 1.3.2).
Tax evasion
Consider a situation when each citizen evades taxes, or p = 0, and expects, from
Lemma 1, τ = k = 1 units of public good from the governor, or plays strategy
(p ,τ) = (0, 1). Suppose that the governor redistributes g = 1 unit, which is always
possible because k = 1. Then, a symmetric strategy profile ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈1〉)
is a Nash equilibrium. Let us verify that.
Note that the expected utility of citizen i is
E ui ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈1〉) =
1
3
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and the expected utility of the governor is




For the strategy profile ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈1〉) to be a Nash equilibrium, it should
be mutual best responses for citizens and the governor to play the strategies
prescribed in this profile. The only possible deviation for the governor is to em-
bezzle 1 unit, i.e. play strategy g = 〈0〉, and her expected utility in this case is
E uG ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈0〉) = 1−3b =−
1
2
< E uG ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈1〉).
The best possible deviation for citizen i = 1 is to pay the tax, and the correspond-
ing expected utility is









< E u1((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈1〉).
Thus, given our parameter values, the strategy profile ((0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1); 〈1〉) is a
Nash equilibrium. We generalize this result in subsection 1.3.3.
1.3.2 Efficient Public Good Provision
In the previous subsection, we had an efficient public good provision example
where all three citizens pay taxes and expect three units of public goods from
the governor, and the governor redistributes three units in the equilibrium. Our
next result generalizes this example and provides conditions for the efficient
public good provision.
THEOREM 1.1. If the public good provision is efficient,
a n ≥ 1,
and the punishment for embezzlement is high enough,
b ≥ 1−a ,
then there exists an efficient public good provision equilibrium where all citizens
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pay taxes and expect τ= n units of public goods from the governor, and the gov-





0, if X < n ,
n , if X = n .
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Consider a strategy profile ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉), where each
citizen pays tax and expects n units of public good, and the Governor redis-
tributes n units of public good, whenever possible. Thus, the expected utility
of citizen i is
E u i ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉) =−1+a n ,
and the expected utility of the Governor is
E uG ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉) = na .
For the strategy profile ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉) to be a Nash equilibrium, it should
be a mutual best response for the players to play the strategy prescribed in the
profile. Below we consider the best possible deviations for the Governor and
citizens.
The best possible deviation for the Governor is to embezzle everything, 〈0〉,
i.e. provide 0 units of public goods. In this case, the expected payoff for the
Governor is:
E uG ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈0〉) = n −n b .
In the equilibrium, it has to be
E uG ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉)≥ E uG ((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈0〉),
or
b ≥ 1−a . (1.6)
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The best possible deviation for citizen 1 is to evade the tax, (0, n ), which leads to
the following expected utility for him
E u 1((0, n ), (1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉)) =
k
n
(−1− z +na ). (1.7)
Note that when citizen 1 evades the tax and is not audited, Governor does not
have enough public funds to provide n units of the public good and therefore
embezzles all public funds.
In the equilibrium, it has to be
E u 1((1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉)≥ E u1((0, n ), (1, n ), ..., (1, n ); 〈n〉),
z ≥
(n −k )(1−a n )
k
.
Since the efficiency condition requires a n ≥ 1, the last inequality holds for any
z ≥ 0. Therefore, (1.6) gives us the condition for the efficient PG provision.
The public good literature has long been looking for the efficient public
good provision mechanisms. The most tractable solution is, probably, the pub-
lic good provision with punishments. See for example Fehr and Gächter (2000,
2002). Theorem 1 demonstrates that the efficient public good provision can
be achieved with a corrupt governor and without punishment for tax evasion if
each citizen is pivotal in the following sense. Each citizen pays taxes and expects
provision of all n units from the governor. If the governor does not provide ex-
actly n units, then each citizen punishes her. The punishment is severe and the
governor prefers to avoid it. This means that the governor will only consider two
options: either provide all n units of public goods or embezzle the whole public
fund. Therefore, each citizen is pivotal for the efficient public good provision: he
expects that his deviation (tax evasion) leads to no public good provision (most
likely, unless he is audited). The governor – the institution – executes the pun-
ishment and the reward here. Hence, surprisingly, we do not need to impose any
punishment for the individual tax evasion. It is interesting to emphasize that the
governor is corrupt and tries to embezzle public funds in the "right" situation,
but, even in this case, she does not want to embezzle funds in the equilibrium.
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Our finding has a similar flavor to that of Gallice and Monzón (2019), who
consider a one-shot sequential public goods game with position uncertainty
and with partial history of immediate predecessors. They find that there is an
equilibrium where everyone contributes without the need of punishment.
1.3.3 Tax Evasion
In the example, we have already seen a tax evasion equilibrium where all three
citizens evade taxes and expect the governor to redistribute just one unit of the
public fund, which the governor always obliges. We generalize this result in the
next theorem.










there exists a tax evasion equilibrium, where all citizens evade taxes and expect
τ= k units of public good, and the governor always provides exactly g = k units.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Consider a strategy profile ((0, k ), (0, k ), ..., (0, k ); 〈k 〉), where
each citizen i evades the tax and expects k units of public goods, and the Gov-
ernor redistributes k units of public goods by means of a cut-off strategy, 〈k 〉.
Thus, the expected utility of citizen i is
E u i ((0, k ), (0, k ), ..., (0, k ); 〈k 〉) =
k
n







and the expected utility of the Governor is given by
E uG ((0, k ), (0, k ), ..., (0, k ); 〈k 〉) = k a .
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For the strategy profile ((0, k ), (0, k ), ..., (0, k ); 〈k 〉) to be an equilibrium, it should
be a mutual best response for the players to play the strategy prescribed in the
profile. Below we consider the best possible deviations for the Governor and
citizens.
The best possible deviation for the Governor is to embezzle everything, i.e.
provide zero units of public goods. The expected payoff for the Governor in this
case is
E uG ((0, k ), (0, k ), ..., (0, k ); 〈0〉) = k −n b .
In the equilibrium, it must be






The best possible deviation for citizen 1 is to pay the tax, (1, k ). The expected
utility for citizen 1 in this case is
E u1((1, k ), (0, k ), ..., (0, k ); 〈k 〉) =−1+a k (1.9)
In the equilibrium, it has to be





Thus, (1.8) and (1.10) provide conditions for the tax evasion equilibrium.
There are several important points to note from Theorem 2. First, if the
punishment for tax evasion is relatively small, then all citizens can evade taxes
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and expect the minimal level of public good provision, k units, from the gover-
nor, who in turn does not have any incentives to produce more than k units of
public goods. These citizens’ expectations are self-enforced in the equilibrium.
Second, punishment conditions for the tax evasion equilibrium depend on
the population size, n , and the number of audited citizens, k . If the population
size, n , and the punishment for tax evasion, z , are fixed, then increasing the
audit level, k , makes it more difficult to sustain the equilibrium. Similarly, if the
audit level, k , and the punishment for tax evasion, z , are fixed, then increasing
the population size, n , makes it easier to sustain the tax evasion equilibrium.
Finally, a tax audit experiment conducted in Denmark (Kleven et al., 2011)
finds that for self-reported income, the empirical results are consistent with our
theoretical prediction: tax evasion is widespread and is negatively related to an
increase in penalties.
1.3.4 Symmetric Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
So far we have considered two extreme cases: in the efficient equilibrium, all cit-
izens pay taxes and the governor redistributes the entire public fund (Theorem
1); in the tax evasion equilibrium, all citizens evade taxes and the governor re-
distributes the minimal amount (Theorem 2). The following result generalizes
Theorems 1 and 2.
THEOREM 1.3. For any citizens’ expectations, τ ∈ {k , k + 1, ..., n}, there exists a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium ((p ,τ), ...(p ,τ); 〈τ〉), where
• all citizens pay taxes with probability p = τ−kn−k and expect τ units of public
goods;





0, if X <τ,
τ, if X ≥τ.
In the equilibrium, the penalty for the tax evasion, z ∗ = z (p , a ) is uniquely deter-
mined, and the penalty for the embezzlement, b ≥ b ∗, has to be above the thresh-
old level, b ∗ = b (τ, a ).
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Proof of Theorem 1.3. Consider a mixed strategy σ−i = (p ,τ) where citizens −i
randomise between paying or evading taxes and expect τ units to be provided
by the Governor, and let us assume that the Governor plays a cut-off strategy,





0, if X <τ,
τ, if X ≥τ.
The expected utility of citizen i when paying tax is given by:


















































































































































Similarly, the expected utility of citizen i by evading tax is given by:














































































































































p j (1−p )n−1− j (0)

. (1.12)
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By re-writing the sums, using distributive law, inside the second square brackets
of (1.11), we get




















































































































































































Further simplifying (1.13) gives us,
















































































































Citizen i will be indifferent if E ui ((1,τ),σ−i , 〈τ〉) = E ui (0,τ);σ−i ; 〈τ〉). Therefore,
equating (1.12) and (1.14) and simplifying we get,
k
n
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For z to be non-negative we need:







From Lemma 1 we have,






Fixingτ, k , n we have p uniquely determined. Plugging this p in equation (1.15)
we get a unique value of z .
Assuming the citizens pay taxes with probability p , for the profile (σ;σ−i ; 〈τ〉)
to be a symmetric MSNE, we want the Governor’s best response to be his cut-off
strategy, 〈τ〉, i.e.,
E uG (σi ,σ−i ; 〈τ〉)≥ E uG (σi ,σ−i ; 0) (1.18)
where the left hand side of the inequality (1.18) is







































































 ( j +ks −n b )

(1.19)
Using absorption identity on the second expression and simplifying the first ex-
pression of (1.19) we get,























































































 (n − j )

(1.20)
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Using absorption identity on the second expression of (1.19) we get,























































































 (n − j )

(1.21)
Manipulating the second and the third expression of (1.21) we get
































































 (n − j )

(1.22)
Next we apply Vandermonde’s identity on the last expression of (1.22)






















































E uG (σi ,σ−i ; 〈τ〉)

















































The right had side of the inequality (1.18) is
E uG (σi ,σ−i ; 0) = k +p (n −k )−n b (1.24)
The proof for (1.24) is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.
Using expressions (1.23) and (1.24) in (1.18) we have
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
(1.25)














































 (n b )

≤ n b
and then solving for b
b ≥
(τ−τa )(D +E )
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We provide an example for Theorem 3 in Appendix A.1. Theorem 3 gives
conditions when it is optimal for the governor to match the citizens’ expecta-
tions. For example, if the governor gets τ+m units in the public fund, then she
will embezzle m units. At the same time, if she receives less than τ units, then
the governor will embezzle everything.
Theorem 3 covers also two extreme cases. In the efficient equilibrium, cit-
izens expect n units, i.e. τ = n , and each citizen pays the tax with probability
1. In the tax evasion equilibrium, citizens expect k units, i.e. τ = k , and every
citizen evades the tax with probability 1. We get the following two corollaries
from Theorem 3.
COROLLARY 1.1. If τ= n, then p = 1 and we have the efficient public good provi-
sion equilibrium.
COROLLARY 1.2. If τ= k , then p = 0 and we have the tax evasion equilibrium.
Theorem 3 shows the importance of citizens’ expectations. Higher expec-
tations lead to a higher level of tax payments and higher public good provision
by the governor. In other words, higher citizens’ expectations encourage a cor-
rupt governor to embezzle less. At the same time, if the governor cannot meet
the expectations, she embezzles everything. Citizens expect that and pay more
taxes to give the governor a chance to produce more public goods. These driving
equilibrium forces are self-fulfilled in the equilibrium.
1.4 Conclusion
We develop a model of tax evasion, corruption, and public good provision. In
the model, citizens create public funds which the governor redistributes. The
governor can embezzle some or all public funds. Here are some recent exam-
ples:
• Malaysia’s ex-Prime Minister, Najib Razak, was arrested in 2018 for one of
the world’s biggest corruption scandals, where according to the US justice
department, more than $4.5 billion funds were stolen from the 1Malaysia
Development Berhad (1MDB). 1MDB is a Malaysian state fund set up in
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2009 to promote development through foreign investments and partner-
ships, and then PM, Najib Razak, was the Chairman (Ellis-Peterson, 25 Oc-
tober 2018).
•A recent news article in Telegraph (Chazan, 5 June 2019) reports that financial
prosecutors suspect that about £442,000 in public money may have been
embezzled by Gerard Collomb, the Mayor of Lyon, France.
•Russian Legal Information Agency (RAPSI-News, 15 July 2019) reports that the
Ex-Finance Minister of the Moscow Region, Alexey Kuznetsov, is charged
with embezzling nearly $200 million.
In our model, we introduce social accountability as a part of an equilib-
rium strategy: citizens form their expectations about the public good provision.
If these expectations are not met, then citizens punish the governor. A recent
event illustrates this punishment: more than 12,000 Czechs gathered in Prague
in a protest to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Andrej Babis over al-
leged misuse of EU Funds (Tait, 4 June 2019). With social accountability, we
show that each citizen is pivotal and it is indeed possible to achieve the efficient
public good provision with the right level of expectations.
1.5 References
1. Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. Ameri-
can Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993.
2. Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical
analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323–338.
3. Alm, J. (2019). What motivates tax compliance? Journal of Economic Sur-
veys, 33(2), 353–388.
4. Andreoni, J., & Bergstrom, T. (1996). Do government subsidies increase the
private supply of public goods? Public Choice, 88(3-4), 295–308.
5. Auerbach, A. M., & Kruks-Wisner, G. (2020). The geography of citizenship
practice: How the poor engage the state in rural and urban india. Perspec-
tives on Politics, 1–17.
28 Chapter 1. Public Good Provision : A Tale of Tax Evasion and Corruption
6. Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2018). Do government audits reduce cor-
ruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians. Journal
of Political Economy, 126(5), 1912–1964.
7. Baldassarri, D., & Grossman, G. (2012). The impact of elections on coop-
eration: evidence from lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. American
Journal of Political Science, 56(4), 964–985.
8. Bobonis, G. J., Cámara Fuertes, L. R., & Schwabe, R. (2016). Monitoring
corruptible politicians. American Economic Review, 106(8), 2371–2405.
9. Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G. (2013). The political re-
source curse. American Economic Review, 103(5), 1759–96.
10. Campante, F. R., & Do, Q.-A. (2014). Isolated capital cities, accountabil-
ity, and corruption: Evidence from US states. American Economic Review,
104(8), 2456–81.
11. Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods
experiments: A selective survey of the literature. Experimental Economics,
14(1), 47–83.
12. Chazan, D. (5 June 2019). Police raid home of Lyon mayor and probe Macron
mentor in embezzlement probe. The Telegraph.
13. Costas-Pérez, E., Solé-Ollé, A., & Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2012). Corruption
scandals, voter information, and accountability. European Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 28(4), 469–484.
14. Duggan, J., & Martinelli, C. (2017). The political economy of dynamic elec-
tions: Accountability, commitment, and responsiveness. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 55(3), 916–84.
15. Ellis-Peterson, H. (25 October 2018). 1MDB scandal explained: A tale of
Malaysia’s missing billions. The Guardian.
16. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994.
17. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature,
415(6868), 137.
1.5. References 29
18. Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of
Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 123(2), 703–745.
19. Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011). Electoral accountability and corruption: Ev-
idence from the audits of local governments. American Economic Review,
101(4), 1274–1311.
20. Fox, J. A. (2015). Social accountability: What does the evidence really say?
World Development, 72, 346–361.
21. Gallice, A., & Monzón, I. (2019). Co-operation in social dilemmas through
position uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 129(621), 2137–2154.
22. Graham, R. L., Knuth, D. E., & Patashnik, O. (1994). Concrete mathematics
: A foundation for computer science (2nd ed.). Reading, Mass., Addison-
Wesley.
23. Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2011).
Unwilling or unable to cheat? evidence from a tax audit experiment in
Denmark. Econometrica, 79(3), 651–692.
24. Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. (2015). Social accountability to contain corrup-
tion. Journal of Development Economics, 116, 158–168.
25. Ledyard, J. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research (J. H.
Kagel & A. Roth, Eds.). In J. H. Kagel & A. Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of
Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press.
26. Litina, A., & Palivos, T. (2016). Corruption, tax evasion and social values.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 124, 164–177.
27. Markussen, T., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J.-R. (2014). Self-organization for
collective action: An experimental study of voting on sanction regimes.
Review of Economic Studies, 81(1), 301–324.
28. Markussen, T., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J.-R. (2016). Judicial error and co-
operation. European Economic Review, 89, 372–388.
29. Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability
in government. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034–1054.
30 Chapter 1. Public Good Provision : A Tale of Tax Evasion and Corruption
30. O’Meally, S. C. (2013). Mapping context for social accountability : A resource
paper (Working Paper No. 79351). The World Bank.
31. Ortner, J., & Chassang, S. (2018). Making corruption harder: Asymmetric
information, collusion, and crime. Journal of Political Economy, 126(5),
2108–2133.
32. Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and po-
litical accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1163–1202.
33. Post, D., & Agarwal, S. (2011). The theory of grievance redress (Brief No. 63910).
The World Bank.
34. RAPSI-News. (15 July 2019). Ex-Moscow region Finance Minister faces trial
on embezzlement charges.
35. Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2004). Local capture: Evidence from a central
government transfer program in Uganda. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119(2), 679–705.
36. Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 387–389.
37. Slemrod, J. (1985). An empirical test for tax evasion. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 232–238.
38. Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2002). Tax avoidance, evasion, and administra-
tion, In Handbook of Public Economics. Elsevier.
39. Tait, R. (4 June 2019). Biggest Czech protest since 1989 calls for PM’s resig-
nation. The Guardian.
40. Treasury, H. (2018). Consolidated fund account 2017-18 (tech. rep.). Con-
troller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
41. Van Weelden, R. (2013). Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives.
Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1622–1651.
42. Weitz-Shapiro, R., & Winters, M. S. (2017). Can citizens discern? Informa-
tion credibility, political sophistication, and the punishment of corruption
in Brazil. Journal of Politics, 79(1), 60–74.
1.5. References 31
43. Welch, S., & Hibbing, J. R. (1997). The effects of charges of corruption on





Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and
Public Good Provision
2.1 Introduction
Tax evasion and public good provision are the two prominent factors affecting
the income and expenditure side of a government budget. It is often seen that
countries fall into the vicious circle of political corruption (such as embezzle-
ment of public funds by government officials for private gain) and tax evasion
(Litina & Palivos, 2016). Despite the obvious link between tax evasion, embez-
zlement and public good provision, there is scant research that connects these
three different strands of literature1. In chapter 1, we provide a model that con-
nects the three strands of literature. This chapter complements the model in
Chapter 1, by relaxing the assumption of symmetric strategies and considering
all possible strategies.
We consider a simple model with two citizens and a governor. First, the cit-
izens decide whether to pay or evade taxes. Then, Nature (an independent tax
agency like Internal Revenue Service in the USA) audits one of the citizens, at
random, and in case of non-payment, the citizen is forced to pay the tax and an
additional penalty. The total tax collected goes into a public fund. After the tax
payment decisions have been made by the citizens, the governor has to decide
how much of the fund to use to provide a public good. Finally, after the gov-
ernor’s decision, citizens express their opinion on whether the governor stole
1See Cowell and Gordon (1988) for a related study linking literature on tax evasion and public
good provision.
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public funds or not. It is important to note that the citizens face asymmetry in
information regarding the total public funds, conditional on who is being au-
dited. We present our model in the form of a four-stage sequential game. The
asymmetric behaviour of the citizens brings us closer to a more realistic society,
where citizens act differently based on their beliefs. One could consider these
two citizens as representatives of two different sections of a society, with homo-
geneity within the members of each section.
Even with our very simple structure, the asymmetry in citizens’ behaviour
opens up a wide range of possibilities which we discuss using the four basic
parameters of the model: a penalty parameter for the non-payment of taxes
(z ), a punishment parameter for the embezzlement of funds (b ), a marginal
per capita return from the public good (α), and a citizen penalty parameter for
wrong claim (c ). Indeed, it turns out that any situation (after elimination of the
dominated strategies) can be a Nash equilibrium for the right choice of param-
eters z , b , α, and c . Given the simplicity of our model and the amplitude of
this result, it is possible to explain what conditions will result in a particular set-
ting. For instance, we can provide specific restrictions on the parameters which
will result in a particular scenario being the equilibrium for the model. In order
to select among different Nash equilibria, we assume that citizens care about
their claim, or c > 0. This natural assumption allows us to refine our predictions
and discuss three Nash equilibria of interest: tax evasion, embezzlement, and
efficient public good provision. We see that the conditions on the parameters
characterising these three equilibria are quite intuitive.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes our model
and the reduced extensive form of the game. Section 2.3 presents the analysis
of the model that includes the main results, a discussion of these results, and
possible connections of these results with the existing literature. We conclude
in Section 2.4.
2.2 Model
We consider a four-stage extensive form game involving two citizens and a gov-
ernor. The citizens need to decide whether or not to pay taxes, given that they
may be audited and punished (in case of non payment). Nature selects one of
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the citizens at random to audit. The total tax collected goes into a public fund.
After the tax payment decisions have been made by the citizens, the governor
has to decide how much of the fund to use to provide a public good. Finally citi-
zens voice their opinion about the governor decision. We formally describe the
four-stage game now.
Stage 1
Nature randomly selects to audit one of the two citizens with equal probability.
Formally, the state of nature is Θ ∈ {C1, C2} where Pr{Θ = C1} = Pr{Θ = C2} = 12
and citizen Θ is audited.
Stage 2
The choice of nature is not known to the citizens and I 1i=1,2 denotes the infor-
mation sets of citizen i at this stage. Ci=1,2 has to decide whether to pay taxes,
ti = 1, or not, ti = 0. We assume that the tax is 1 unit for each citizen and the
total taxes go towards a public fund. Any non-payment implies tax evasion, i.e.
0 unit paid towards the public fund. After the citizens make their decisions, the
information about the audit is revealed. If a non tax-paying citizen is audited,
he will need to pay 1+ z , where z ≥ 0 is the sanction (penalty) parameter.
Stage 3
Governor G receives the total public fund X , given by:
X =
¨
2, i f {Θ =Ci } & {t j 6=i = 1},
1, i f {Θ =Ci } & {t j 6=i = 0}.
(2.1)
If both citizens C1 and C2 pay taxes, the governor G will have X = 2 units,
and it doesn’t matter which citizen is audited. In a situation when both citizens
C1 and C2 evade taxes (i.e. non-payment of taxes), one of them is audited and
will have to pay 1 unit (along with a sanction of z ), implying a total contribution
of X = 1 unit. If only one of the citizens evades taxes we have X = 2 units (X = 1
unit) when the tax-evading citizen is audited (tax-evading citizen is not audited).
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Formally, the governor G has two information sets : IG = {I 1G , I
2
G }, where
I 1G = {X = 1} and I
2
G = {X = 2} (2.2)
After G receives the public fund X , he decides how much of the public good
to provide. When X = 2, the action set for G is {L , H }, where L (Low) and H
(High) represent 1 and 2 units, respectively, of the public good provided by G .
When X = 1, the governor G can only provide 1 unit, L , of the public good.
We assume that G benefits from the public good provision too. We define an
embezzling G as the governor who peculates one unit of public good when X =
2.
Stage 4
In the final stage of the game, we model a proxy for voting by incorporating a
guessing mechanism where the citizens, C1 and C2, are required to guess whether
total fund, X , is high (h) or low (l ). We assume that wrong guess is costly and
each citizen wants to guess correctly. Depending on which citizen was audited
in Stage 1, one of them has more information about the possible X ; we explain
this below.
• If G plays H (provides 2 units of public good), each citizen has the domi-
nant (guess) action h .
• If G plays L (provides 1 unit of public good), each citizen Ci=1,2 has three





I 2i = {(Θ =Ci , t j 6=i = 0, L ), (Θ =Ci , t j 6=i = 1, L )}, (2.3)
I 3i = {(Θ =C j 6=i , ti = 1, L )}, (2.4)
and
I 4i = {(Θ =C j 6=i , ti = 0, L )}. (2.5)
At I 2i , citizen Ci is not sure about the total public fund X and Ci ’s action set
is {l , h}. At I 3i , citizen Ci knows X = 2 and his dominant action is h . Similarly at
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I 4i , citizen Ci knows X = 1 and his dominant action is l . For each citizen Ci=1,2,
let g i denote the guesses made by him:
g i ∈ {h , l } (2.6)
The guessing mechanism helps in representing a set-up where the citizens
can punish (file a complaint, for example) against a governor who embezzles.
The only situation this can happen is when X = 2 and the governor decides to
provide 1 unit of the public good. Given that the governor embezzles, if the cit-
izens correctly guess the total X , G ’s payoff will decrease by b ≥ 0 for every cor-
rect guess, i.e. the governor loses confidence of his citizens. On the other hand,
Ci ’s payoff will decrease by c ≥ 0 for a wrong guess.
We consider α as the marginal per capita return (or MPCR) of the public
good, with α> 0. The game concludes after Stage 4.
The payoff of Ci=1,2 is a function of:

Θ ∈ {C1, C2}; t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1};{L , H } ; g i ∈ {h , l }

.
The payoff for G is a function of:
[Θ ∈ {C1, C2}; t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1};{L , H } ; g1, g2 ∈ {h , l }].
Game Tree
We represent our extensive form game with a game tree. The nature starts the
game by choosing which citizen C1 or C2 to audit (with probability
1
2 ). C1 and C2
do not know who is being audited and they decide, simultaneously, whether to
pay or evade taxes. The total taxes go towards a public fund (X ). After citizens
have made their moves, G receives X . G can not observe the actions of C1 and
C2 from the previous stage and has two information sets: I
2
G for X = 2 and I
1
G for
X = 1. At I 2G he has two actions, either provide 2 units (H ) or provide 1 unit (L)
of the public good; while at I 1G his only action is L . After G has made his deci-
sion, C1 and C2 will guess how much X was, which is the last stage of the game.
When Ci is not sure about X he will be at information set I
2
i . At information set
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I 3i (similarly, I
4
i ), Ci is sure that X = 2 (X = 1), and thus has a dominant action
of h (l ). This gives us the reduced form of the game tree with 20 terminal nodes
and the corresponding payoffs being summarized in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Reduced extensive form of the game
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Table 2.1: Table of Payoffs
Terminal nodes C1 C2 G
T1 −1+2α −1+2α 2α
T2 −1− z +2α −1+2α 2α
T3 −1+2α −1+2α 2α
T4 −1+2α −1− z +2α 2α
T5 −1+α− c −1+α 1+α− b
T6 −1+α −1+α 1+α−2b
T7 −1+α α α
T8 −1+α− c α α
T9 −1− z +α− c −1+α 1+α− b
T10 −1− z +α −1+α 1+α−2b
T11 −1− z +α α α
T12 −1− z +α− c α α
T13 −1+α −1+α− c 1+α− b
T14 −1+α −1+α 1+α−2b
T15 −1+α −1− z +α− c 1+α− b
T16 −1+α −1− z +α 1+α−2b
T17 α −1+α α
T18 α −1+α− c α
T19 α −1− z +α α
T20 α −1− z +α− c α
2.3 Analysis of the Model
A pure strategy for a citizen (or governor) specifies a complete plan of actions,
i.e. an action for the citizen (or governor) at each information set. For each
i ∈ 1, 2, the pure strategy set for citizen Ci consists of the Cartesian product
{1, 0} × {l , h} × {l , h} × {l , h} . Similarly, the pure strategy set for governor G is
given by {L , H }×{L}. Each citizen has 4 information sets with 2 actions at each
information set. Therefore, each citizen has 24 = 16 pure strategies. The pure
strategy set of citizen i ∈ 1, 2 is Si = {1l l l , 1l l h , 1l hl , . . . , 1hhh , 0l l l , . . . , 0hhh}.
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At information sets I 3i and I
4
i , h and l are the dominant actions for citizen
i . Thus, we eliminate dominated strategies and consider only a “reduced” strat-
egy set (with some abuse of notation) for citizen i : S ′i = {1l , 1h , 0l , 0h}, where
two actions in each strategy report choices at information sets I 1i and I
2
i . The
governor has only one action at information set I 1G . Thus, with some abuse of
notation, we denote the governor’s strategy set as S ′G = {L , H }. The following re-
duced normal form gameB (see Table 2.2) summarizes the expected payoffs2
for all the possible outcomes of the game.
We are ready to present our first result now.
THEOREM 2.1. For any strategy profile s ∗ = (s1, s2, sG ), there exist parameters z , c ,α, b
such that s ∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where si=1,2 ∈ {(1l ), (1h ), (0l ), (0h )}
and sG ∈ {L , H }.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. For any strategy profile to be a PSNE, strategies of players
in the profile have to be mutual best responses. Consider the strategy profile
((1l ), (1l ), L ). For C1 (similarly, C2), given that C2 ( C1) plays 1l and L , respectively,
1l has to be the response of citizen C1 ( C2). Given that C1 and C2 plays 1l , L has
to be the best response of G . That is, for Ci=1,2 , we have the following:






2An example: A strategy profile such as (1h , 0l , L ) refers to citizen 1 playing 1h , citizen 2 play-
ing 0l and the governor G playing L . Given this, the expected payoffs are as follows:
E (uC1 ) =
1
2
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z ≥ 1+ c
and for G , we have
E uG (1l , 1l , L )≥ E uG (1l , 1l , H )
1− b +α≥ 2α
b ≤ 1−α
From the inequalities above, we have z ≥ 1, c = 0 and b ≤ 1−α as the conditions
for the strategy profile ((1l ), (1l ), L ) to be a PSNE. Analogously, we can derive
the conditions on parameters z , b , c ,α required for the remaining 31 strategy
profiles to be a PSNE for the reduced normal form game. In the interest of space
and to avoid repetition, we do not include the proofs here in this chapter but a
summary of the conditions have been provided in Table 2.3.
We observe that any strategy profile in the reduced normal form gameB
can be a PSNE and Table 2.2 summarizes the corresponding conditions on the
parameters z , c , b , α such that Theorem 1 holds true. Each cell in Table 2 pro-
vides the restrictions on the parameters such that the outcome corresponding
to that particular cell (from Table 2.2) is a PSNE. For example, consider the out-
come ((0h ), (1h ), H ) in Table 2.2 where citizen 1 plays 0h , citizen 2 plays 1h and
governor chooses to play H . From Table 2.3, it is easy to see that when c = 0,
z = 1−α and b ≥ 12 (1−α), ((0h ), (1h ), H ) is a PSNE of the game. Our model pro-
vides an extremely rich setting which helps us describe any possible situation
using four simple parameters. We are not aware of another model which obtains
a similar result, where any outcome can be generated (as a PSNE) by selecting a
suitable set of parameters. Given the the amplitude of this result, it is possible to
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explain what conditions will result in a particular setting. For instance, we can
provide specific restrictions on the parameters which will result in a particular
scenario (such as the citizens evading taxes or the governor embezzling funds,
etc.) to exist in a society.
It is important to note that in this model the citizens are asymmetric, and
therefore Theorem 1 encompasses many possibilities (see Chapter 1 for some
results in a symmetric game) We now want to restrict our discussion to some
specific situations of economic interest and for the purpose of doing so we as-
sume some restrictions on parameter c .
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Table 2.2: Reduced normal form game
L
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l −1+α− 12 c −1+α−
1
2 c −1+α −1+α


















1h −1+α −1+α −1+α− 12 c −1+α−
1
2 c
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H
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l −1+2α −1+2α −1+ 32α −1+
3
2α



















































































































Table 2.3: Conditions on parameters
L
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l c = 0, z ≥ 1 c = 0, z ≥ 1 c = 0, z = 1 c ≥ 0, z = 1
b ≤ 1−α b ≤ 23 (1−α) b ≤ (1−α) b ≤
1
2 (1−α)
1h c = 0, z ≥ 1 c ≥ 0, z ≥ 1 c = 0, z = 1 c = 0, z = 1
b ≤ 23 (1−α) b ≤
1
2 (1−α) b ≤ 1−α b ≤
1
2 (1−α)
0l c = 0, z = 1 c = 0, z = 1 c ≥ 0, z ≤ 1 c = 0, z ≤ 1
b ≤ 1−α b ≤ (1−α) ————– ——–
0h c ≥ 0, z = 1 c = 0, z = 1 c = 0, z ≤ 1 c = 0, z ≤ 1
b ≤ 12 (1−α) b ≤
1
2 (1−α) —————- ————
H
1l 1h 0l 0h
1l z ≥ 1−α z ≥ 1−α c ≥ 0, z = 1−α c ≥ 0, z = 1−α
b ≥ 1−α b ≥ 23 (1−α) b ≥ 1−α b ≥
1
2 (1−α)
1h z ≥ 1−α z ≥ 1−α c = 0, z = 1−α c = 0, z = 1−α
b ≥ 23 (1−α) b ≥
1
2 (1−α) b ≥ 1−α b ≥
1
2 (1−a )
0l c ≥ 0, z = 1−α c = 0, z = 1−α c ≥ 0, z ≤ 1−α c = 0, z ≤ 1−α
b ≥ 1−α b ≥ 1−α —— —-
0h c ≥ 0, z = 1−α c = 0, z = 1−α c = 0, z ≤ 1−α c = 0, z ≤ 1−α
b ≥ 12 (1−α) b ≥
1
2 (1−α) —- ——-
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2.3.1 c > 0
Assuming the citizens do care about the wrong guesses (i.e. c > 0), we discuss
below few interesting outcomes/scenarios.
COROLLARY 2.1. Given that the penalty of tax evasion is relatively small, i.e.
0≤ z ≤ 1, (2.7)
there exists at least one pure-strategy (tax evasion) Nash equilibrium where both
citizens evade taxes.
Given the condition in equation 2.7, we have two pure-strategy (tax evasion)
Nash equilibrium profiles: ((0l ), (0l ), L ) and ((0l ), (0l ), H ), where both citizens
evade taxes and guess correctly that the governor had one unit for public good
provision, and the governor provides L and H level of public good, respectively,
with the latter being out of the equilibrium path. Our Corollary 1 is consistent
with most of the literature on tax evasion: if the penalty on tax evasion is small,
then each citizen has the dominant strategy to avoid paying taxes. The theo-
retical literature on tax evasion goes back to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Yitzhaki (1974) These studies provide simple theoretical model where individual
tax payers decide whether or not to evade taxes in the presence tax enforcement
(i.e. random audits, penalties, etc.). There have been extensions to these two
models in various contexts and Sandmo (2005) provide an extensive review on
the literature on tax evasion. A more recent study by Kleven et al. (2011) extends
the model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and suggest that for self-reported
income the empirical results are aligned with the theoretical model, i.e. tax eva-
sion is substantial and is negatively related to an increase in penalties, probabil-
ity of audit, etc. This result can also be connected to another stream of literature
on sanctions in case of public good games3.
COROLLARY 2.2. Given that the penalty of tax evasion is high enough,
z ≥ 1,
3There is extensive literature on peer-punishments to improve welfare and compliance for
public good games; see, for instance, Fehr and Gächter (2002), Baldassarri and Grossman (2011),
Baldassarri and Grossman (2012), among others.
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there exists a pure-strategy (embezzlement) Nash equilibrium where at least one
citizen pays her taxes and the governor embezzles one unit of public good, when-
ever he has an opportunity to do so.
This proposition shows that high punishment for tax evasion forces citi-
zens to pay taxes. At the same time, a small enough punishment for embezzle-
ment encourages the governor to steal one unit. Given the conditions on b and
z (> 1) we have three pure-strategy (embezzlement) Nash equilibria. First, we
have ((1h ), (1h ), L ), where both citizens pay their taxes and guess correctly that
the governor had two units for public good provision and the governor provides
L level, i.e. the governor embezzles one unit of public good. For z = 1 (and same
restriction on b as provided by Corollary 2 above) we have ((1l ), (0h ), L ) and
((0h ), (1l ), L ) as the PS(embezzlement)NE where only one of the citizen evades
tax and the governor embezzles when the opportunity arises (i.e. when tax-
evading citizen is audited resulting in X = 2 for the governor to re-distribute).
This result is very intuitive and similar results4 exist in the literature which exam-
ine whether some form of accountability (may be, electoral) could discourage
peculation.
COROLLARY 2.3. If the punishment for tax evasion in high enough,
z ≥ (1−α),
and the punishment for embezzlement is high enough,
b ≥ (1−α),
then there exists a pure strategy (public good provision) Nash equilibrium where
at least one citizen pays taxes and the governor re-distributes the entire public
fund.
4See Welch and Hibbing (1997), Peters and Welch (1980), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Fis-
man and Miguel (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2008), Barr et al. (2009), Ferraz and Finan (2011),
Bobonis et al. (2016), Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017), among others.
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This proposition demonstrates that if both punishments for tax evasion and
embezzlement are high enough, then every member benefits. For z = 1−α (and
the same restriction on b as given by Proposition 3 above), we have ((0l ), (1l ), H ),
((0h ), (1l ), H ), ((1l ), (0l ), H ), ((1l ), (0h ), H ) as the pure-strategy (public good pro-
vision) Nash equilibria of the game where only one of the citizens pay taxes (i.e.
an asymmetry in the behaviour of the citizens5) and the governor is honest i.e.
re-distributes two units of public good when the opportunity arises (if the tax-
evading citizen is audited, governor has X = 2).
To ensure an efficient public good provision, i.e. a situation where both citizens
pay taxes and the governor redistributes the entire public fund, we impose a
strict restriction on z (keeping the restriction on b same as above).
COROLLARY 2.4. For z > (1−α), there exists a pure strategy (‘efficient’ pubic good
provision) Nash equilibrium where both citizens pay their taxes and the governor
re-distributes the entire public fund.
We assume 13 ≤ α ≤ 1 for efficiency, and given the restrictions on z and b
from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, we have ((1l ), (1h ), H ), ((1h ), (1l , H ), ((1l ), (1l ), H )
as the pure-strategy (‘efficient’ public good provision) Nash equilibria of the
game where both the citizens pay taxes and the governor makes high two-unit,
H , public good provision and the citizens guess either l or h in this information
set, which is out of the equilibrium path.
There is an extensive theoretical literature on optimal public good provi-
sion which looks at various (punishment) mechanisms (see Groves and Ledyard
(1977) for details) which encourage individuals to make contributions towards
the public fund. Falkinger (1995) propose incentive schemes where the govern-
ment should reward (via subsidies) or penalize (via additional taxes) deviations
from mean contribution in order to increase efficiency. Some more recent ex-
perimental studies6 try to test the validity of the theoretical results to find that
some form of penalties encourage contributions (or reduce tax evasion). Citi-
zens’ behaviour depends on the motivations, intentions and behaviour of the
government. Empirical evidence suggests citizens are likely to evade taxes if
5See Erard and Feinstein (1994) and Gibson et al. (2013) for related literature.
6See Alm et al. (1992), Chen and Plott (1996), Falkinger et al. (2000) , Uler (2011), Robbett
(2016), among others.
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they believe the government will not provide good service. Citizens will com-
ply if the government reciprocates their trust (see Luttmer and Singhal (2014),
Slemrod (2007)). Casaburi and Troiano (2016) provide evidence of a positive
interaction between improved tax-payer monitoring systems and political in-
centives, i.e. there is increase in the re-election likelihood with introduction of
better auditing technologies, especially in areas where the government is more
efficient in providing public goods.
2.4 Conclusion
We provide a simple unified model of tax evasion, embezzlement and public
good provision and show the links between the three. Our model provides an
extremely rich setting, where with the help of our four basic parameters we can
describe any possible situation. The amplitude of this result enables us to ex-
tend the model in various directions (empirical, experimental and theoretical).
The model and our equilibrium predictions can be tested in a laboratory ex-
perimental setup. In addition to this, the model can be tested in a field with
support of some real data. One can also think of how the equilibrium behaviour
of the players will change when the model is considered in a repeated setting.
We postpone these ideas for future work.
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Position uncertainty in a sequential
public goods game: An Experiment
3.1 Introduction
Producing public goods at a socially optimal level is difficult because individ-
ual incentives and collective interest are often at odds. When contributing to a
public good is costly, the possibility to free-ride on the contributions of others
can be an obstacle to achieve a socially optimal outcome. Typically, to improve
contribution by self-interested agents requires repeated strategic interactions
over an infinite horizon (see Friedman (1971) on theoretical literature in a social
dilemma setting; and see Dal Bó et al. (2010), Duffy and Ochs (2009) for experi-
mental evidence in this direction). The public goods literature has shown that it
is possible to improve contribution if the agents have non-standard preferences
or agents are not fully rational (e.g., warm-glow, altruism etc) (Andreoni, 1990;
Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002).
In this chapter, I test the prediction of the public good game made by Gal-
lice and Monzón (2019). The authors show that full-contribution is possible in
a one-shot public goods game with self-interested agents. To fix ideas, consider
a public goods game with a finite number of agents. Agents contribute sequen-
tially but do not know their position in the sequence. They are equally likely to
be anywhere in the sequence. Before contributing each agent observes partial
history - the total contributions of her immediate predecessors. After all agents
have made their contributions, the total contribution is multiplied by the re-
turn from contributions parameter, and then divided equally among all agents.
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Chapter 3. Position uncertainty in a sequential public goods game: An
Experiment
Gallice and Monzón (2019) show that there is an equilibrium where everyone
contributes if the multiplier is above some threshold.
In order to test this prediction, I conduct an online experiment with two
treatments. In the first treatment, participants play a simple sequential public
good game. Participants observe all previous contributions before they make
their decision to contribute. This is the baseline treatment. In the second treat-
ment, participants play a sequential game akin to Gallice and Monzón (2019).
Participants are unaware of their position in the sequence and they contribute
sequentially. They observe the history of their two immediate predecessors be-
fore they make their decision. In the first treatment, I find evidence that contri-
bution, at the group level, are close to socially optimum levels. Comparing the
contributions (at group level) between treatment one and treatment two, I find
that contributions are much lower in the second treatment. This suggests that
the results from the experiment do not support the hypothesis - contributions
are higher in sequential game compared to the sequential game with position
uncertainty.
There is a lot of literature on public goods games. This chapter focuses on
a sequential public goods game so the paper contributes to the literature on se-
quential public goods game. Varian (1994) models a public goods game with
sequential contribution. He compares sequential contributions with simulta-
neous contributions. Assuming that one player’s contribution is a perfect sub-
stitute of another player’s contribution, he finds that in a sequential game the
first mover free rides on the subsequent players. Therefore, the total contribu-
tion in the sequential contribution will be lower than a simultaneous contribu-
tion mechanism, i.e., sequential timing lowers total contributions.
There are experimental papers comparing sequential contribution mecha-
nism versus simultaneous mechanism. Gächter et al. (2010) designs an experi-
ment based on Varian (1994)’s model with two players, quasi-linear returns, and
complete information about returns. Their paper focuses on the asymmetry of
returns from the public goods. In the first setting, they find that under sequen-
tial contribution overall provision is lower compared to simultaneous contribu-
tions and first movers do not have any advantage. In the second setting, they
find evidence that second movers free ride.
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Andreoni et al. (2002) did a similar experiment- comparing simultaneous
and sequential games. Unlike Gächter et al. (2010), they introduce minimal
asymmetry between players. They find that in early rounds the first movers
were taking advantage of the second mover, but by the end of the experiment
results from the simultaneous contribution game and the sequential contribu-
tion game were similar. My design is different from Andreoni et al. (2002) and
Gächter et al. (2010). In my design there is no asymmetry in the return on public
goods and I use more than 2 players in each public goods game. In one of my
treatments, I test a new theory that predicts the possibility of full contribution in
one-shot public goods game with position uncertainty. In Andreoni et al. (2002)
and Gächter et al. (2010) players know their position in the game and observe
complete history.
Several papers focus on endogenously determining the public goods game
to play. Potters et al. (2005) studied the difference between simultaneous con-
tribution and sequential contribution. In one of the treatments subjects voted
on the mechanism - simultaneous versus sequential. In the other treatment, the
mechanism was exogenously picked by the experimenter. The results from the
experiment show that subjects prefer the sequential move game and the contri-
butions are larger in the sequential move game. In my experiment, subjects do
not vote for the mechanism, instead, the experimenter decides on the mecha-
nism. Other papers along this direction include Romano and Yildirim (2001),
Vesterlund (2003).
I also contribute to the literature on games with position uncertainty and
observational learning. In a typical game with position uncertainty, a princi-
pal decides what information to reveal to the agents (Nishihara, 1997). In my
design, agents directly observe the contributions of the predecessors.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, in Section 3.2, I present the
theoretical foundation of the experiment. Second, in Section 3.3, I present the
design of the experiment. Third, in Section 3.4, I present the results from the
experiment. Finally, I conclude in Section 3.5.
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3.2 Theoretical Predictions
Consider a game with N = {1, .., 6} in a group1. A player i ∈ N must choose
whether to contribute to a public good , i.e., ai ∈ {1, 0}. Action ai = 1 means
contributing a fixed amount 1 to a common pool, while ai = 0 means con-
tributing 0 in the common pool. Players make decisions sequentially but they
have no information regarding their position in the sequence. They are equally
likely to be in any position. Every player observes some sample s = (m , c ) of
her immediate predecessors’ decisions before they make their decision, where
m is the number of predecessor sampled and c is the number of contributors.
Let G−i =
∑
j 6=i 1{a j = 1} denote the number of players who contribute. So
G−i ∈ {0, 1, ....., 5}. Therefore, payoffs u (ai ,G−i ) can thus be expressed as
ui (1,G−i ) =α(G−i +1)−1 and ui (0,G−i ) =αG−i , (3.1)
where α= r6 is the marginal per capita return(MPCR) from the public good.
This is an extensive form game with imperfect information. Players form
beliefs about their position in the sequence and about the history of the past
play. Gallice and Monzón (2019) use the notion of sequential equilibrium. Player
i ’s strategy is a function σi that specifies the probability of contributing given
the sample received. Let σ = {σi }i∈N denote a strategy profile and µ = {µi }i∈N
a system of beliefs. The assessment (σ∗,µ∗) is a sequential equilibrium if σ∗ is
sequentially rational given µ∗, and µ∗ is consistent given σ∗. Given a profile of
play σ, let µi denote player i ’s beliefs about past play. To understand how be-
liefs are formed, consider a game with only three players and a sample size of
one. When a player is asked to make a decision he knows that there are seven
possible histories of past play : {∅, (1), (0), (1, 1), (1, ), (0, 1), (0, 0)}. Players form be-
liefs after receiving the sample. A player who observes s = (1, 1) knows that he
is not in the first position. He could be in any position with the history of play
that has contribution as the last action : {(1), (1, 1), (0, 1)}. Instead, if a player ob-
serves m = (0, 0) he realises that history of past play is ∅, and so he is in the first
position.
1Please note that in Gallice and Monzón (2019)’s model there are n players. Here I describe
the model with 6 players because in my experiment I will have 6 players in each group.
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LetH be the set of all possible histories. Consider all samples without de-
fection, and denote this by H C . This set consists of all samples where m = c , i.e.,
the number of observed individuals m equals to the number of observed indi-
viduals who contribute. The first player in the sequence only receives a sam-
ple without defection:(0, 0) ∈H C . First, consider a player i who observes some
s ∈H C . This happens on the equilibrium path where everyone contributes, so
players can infer that all his predecessors have contributed ; and he knows if he
contributes, his successors will also contribute. Therefore his expected payoff
from the contribution is Eu [u (1,Gi )|s ] = r −1 for all s ∈H C . This payoff does not
depend on player i ’s beliefs about his position in the sequence. Agent’s payoff
from defecting does depend on her beliefs about her position. To see this, let’s
assume that agent i knows her position, i.e., she knows that she is in position t .
If all of her predecessor contributed, and she does not contribute, then none of
her successor will contribute. This means exactly t −1 players contributed. The
payoff from defecting will be (r /n )(t −1). Figure 3.1 shows agent i’s payoffs as a
function of her position. It shows that the payoffs from contribution, for agents
early in the sequence, is larger than from defecting. But agents placed late in
the sequence prefers defection. So, if agents knew their position, contribution
would unravel.
Now consider a player who observes m ≥ 2 players contribute and she is
unaware of where she is in the sequence. Then the player can deduce she is not
in the first m positions, and she has the equal probability to be in in any position
between m and 6. Therefore she expects to be in position (7+m )/2, and expects
(5+m )/2 players to have already contributed. Therefore, her expected payoff
from not contributing (i.e., defection) will be
r (5+m )
12




and this simplifies to
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Payoffs Conditional on Position and on sample without defection (where r = 2.4)
Payoffs from defecting
Payoffs from contributing





Prediction. Consider a simple profile of play where agents contribute unless
they observe defection. Then, if m ≥ 2 and r ≥ 127−m , there is sequential equilib-
rium with full contribution equilibrium outcome.
If sample contains m ′ < m total actions, then the player knows she is in
position m ′+1. She can infer that the number of agents who contributed so far
is m ′. Therefore, the expected payoff from defecting is even lower : (r /n )m ′ <
(r /n )(5+m )/2.Thus, equation (3.2) also guarantees that players in the first m
positions contribute.
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3.3 Experiment Design
3.3.1 Procedure
The experiment was conducted online using Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk),
and the geographic location was restricted to the USA. The experiment was pro-
grammed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and was deployed to mTurk. Participants
were invited to sign-up within 20 minutes of the experiment (or HIT)2 being
posted and requested them to complete the experiment in 45 minutes. The ex-
periment was only active for 70 minutes. This was done to encourage partici-
pants to start the task immediately (see Arechar et al. (2018) on general advice to
run interactive experiments on mTurk). To prevent a participant from partici-
pating twice, a ‘qualification’ was granted to each participant in the experiment.
Then workers who were granted this ‘qualification’ were blocked from partici-
pating again.
Each session was designed to accommodate 12 participants3 divided into
2 groups. To reduce drop-outs, groups were formed on the ‘fly’. Groups were
formed in the order they arrived. So the first 6 participants to arrive are grouped
together, and the next 6 participants to arrive are grouped together. Ten sessions
were run, but only 5 sessions were useful. This is because of lack of participation
and dropouts. In the 5 valid sessions, it was only possible to form 1 group each
session. So a total of 30 participants actively participated in the experiment.
In all the sessions, participants played a public good game for 12 rounds.
The first 2 rounds were practice rounds. The public good game that the partic-
ipants played in each session varied according to the treatment. Each partic-
ipant was endowed with 100 points. They were asked whether they wanted to
contribute all the 100 points or 0 points in a common project. The rate of return,
r , was set to 2.4 so that marginal per capita return, α, is 0.4.
In all sessions, earnings were calculated as follows:
ui (ai ,G−i ) =α(G−i +ai )−ai + ei (3.3)
2HIT or Human Intelligence Tasks are virtual tasks that a ‘worker’ can work on, submit an
answer, and collect a reward for completing
3oTree automatically doubles the number of participants when a session is created. This is
because spares are needed in case some MTurk workers accepts the HIT but then return the
assignment.
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where ai is the participant’s contribution, Gi is total contributions of other par-
ticipants in each group, and ei is the endowment.
In every session, the participants were paid after 12th round. Only one of
the rounds between round 3 and 12 was picked randomly for payment (first
two rounds were practice rounds). This reduces the hedging opportunities and
cross-contamination between rounds (Azrieli et al., 2018; Charness et al., 2016).
Participants received a participant fee of $2. In order to promote recruitment
rates, participation fee was relatively high. The earnings were converted into
cash so that 30 points = $1. The average earnings was $ 7.481 with a standard
deviation of $ 1.167.
3.3.2 Treatments and Design
In Treatment 1 (T1), subjects play a sequential voluntary contribution game.
Each participant was endowed with 100 points every round. Participants were
asked to contribute to a common project. Contributions could be either 100 or
0 points. The decisions were made sequentially. The computer assigned roles
to each player. For example, if the role was player 1 then he/she had to make the
decision first. Then, participant who got the role of player 2 makes his/her deci-
sion, then player 3 and so on. The roles were randomly determined each round.
Before the participants made their decision, they were informed about the con-
tributions made by their predecessors, and they were also informed about their
role in the game. Only player 1 in the game did not receive any information
regarding past play because there were no players before him. At the end of ev-
ery round, subjects were informed about the contributions of each player, total
contributions, their contribution, and earnings. Theoretical prediction of this
treatment is that subjects will not contribute. It is easy to check by solving this
sequential game by backward induction.
Hypothesis 1 In T1, subjects will not contribute to public goods.
In Treatment 2(T2), subjects played a sequential voluntary contribution game
similar to the game in T1. Each participant was endowed with 100 points every
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round. Participants were asked to contribute to a common project. Contribu-
tions could be either 100 or 0 points. In this treatment, subjects were not in-
formed about their position in the sequence of play. The computer assigned
roles to each player. For example, if the role was player 1 then he/she had to
make the decision first. Then, the participant who got the role of player 2 made
his/her decision, then player 3 and so on. The roles were randomly determined
each round. Subjects were not informed about their role. They only received in-
formation about the total contribution of their 2 immediate predecessor. This
means the subjects received one of the following information:
• Your 2 immediate predecessor have contributed 0
• Your 2 immediate predecessor have contributed 100
• Your 2 immediate predecessor have contributed 200
Only the subject playing the role of Player 1 did not receive any information
regarding the past play. Subjects were informed about this in the instruction
before the experiment began. They were also informed about what ’predeces-
sor’ meant in the instruction. At the end of every round subjects were informed
about the contributions of each player, total contributions, their contribution,
and earnings. Gallice and Monzón (2019) predicts that if α (marginal per capita
return) is high enough and the sample of history they observe is at least 2, then
there exists an equilibrium where everyone contributes. Therefore, I expect, in
treatment 2, there will be more contributions compared to sequential game in
treatment 1.
Hypothesis 2 In T2, total contributions in each group will be higher compared
to sequential game in Treatment 1.
3.4 Results
In this section, I present the results of the experiment. The descriptive statis-
tics in Table B.1 for Treatment 1 shows that mean contributions at group level
is almost close to maximum level of contribution at the group level. While, in
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Table B.2, for Treatment 2 the mean contribution at group level is 475. This pat-
tern is more evident if we look at group contributions across rounds (see 3.2).
In Treatment 1 Contributions at group level were close to full contribution level
almost every round. Whereas, in Treatment 2, there is an upward trend on con-
tributions at the group level. Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that con-
tribution levels in Treatment 1 is higher than contributions level in Treatment 2.
Figure 3.2: Average contributions across rounds
Comparing the medians of the two treatments (see Figure 3.3) suggests that
contributions are much higher in Treatment 1. In Figure 3.3 we can see that me-
dian contributions in Treatment 1 is 550, whereas the median contributions in
Treatment 2 is 500. A two-tailed Wicoxon-Mann-Whitney test suggests that this
difference is significant at any level (see TableB.4). This does not support my
second hypothesis that contribution levels will be higher in Treatment 2 com-
pared to Treatment 1 . My first hypothesis was that in Treatment 1 participants
will not contribute to public goods. A two-tailed t-test of contributions (at group
level) suggests that this is not true at any significant level (see B.3. Overall, the
results can be summarized as follows:
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Figure 3.3: Box plot : comparing contributions at group level
Result 1. There is no evidence to suggest that in a sequential move public goods
game contributions will be zero.
Result 2. Contributions at group level in a sequential game is significantly higher
than sequential game with position uncertainty.
The prediction in Section 3.2 was based on a profile of play where play-
ers contribute unless they observe defection (similar to a grim-trigger strategy).
This means that the contribution of the player playing first is crucial and would
dictate the future play. To check the significance of the first mover, I do a re-
gression analysis where the dependant variable is individual contributions and
the main variable of interest is First Mover. Table 3.1 reports the results. In Ta-
ble 3.1, First Mover is a dummy where it takes the value of 1 if the first mover
contributed, otherwise it takes a value of zero. The first column reports regres-
sion for all the rounds, and the second column reports results from Rounds 3-12
(since the first two rounds are practice rounds). The results show that the first
mover do play a significant role on the individual contributions.
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Table 3.1: Regression analysis of Treatment 2
All Rounds Rounds 3-12
Contribution Contribution







Adjusted R 2 0.060 0.061
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented an experiment comparing two different sequen-
tial public goods game. The experiment result shows that contributions in a
sequential move public goods game is higher than predicted. In a sequential
move public goods game with position uncertainty, theory predicts that there is
an equilibrium with full contribution. This prediction leads to the hypothesis
that contributions in this game will be higher than the classic sequential game
(in Treatment 1). But, the experiment results show that median contribution,
at group level, is lower in the sequential game with position uncertainty. Fu-
ture extension of this research includes adding more treatments and running
more sessions on Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. One possible treatment could
be having a treatment where participants only observe one predecessor’s deci-
sion, instead of two. If a player observes one sample, then Gallice and Monzón
(2019) predict that a (possibly) mixed equilibrium generates full contribution.
Another treatment could be a game with simultaneous moves.
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A.1 Example
Consider a game with n = 3,τ = 2, and k = 1. If citizens 2 and 3 pay taxes with proba-
bility p ≥ 0 and the governor uses a cut-off strategy to provides 2 units of public goods,
citizen 1’s expected utility from paying the tax is








Assuming citizen 2 and 3 pay taxes with probability p and the governor provides 2 units
of public good, citizen 1’s expected utility from evading tax is given by:
E u1((0, 2), (p , 2), (p , 2); 〈2〉) =
1
3
(−2a (p −4)p − z −1) (A.2)
Equating (A.1) and (A.2) and simplifying gives us a value of z which makes citizen 1
indifferent between paying or evading taxes, i.e.,
z = 2(2a p −2a +1) (A.3)










from (A.3), and given z ≥ 0, we have a ≤ 1.
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Assuming the citizens pay taxes with probability p , for the profile ((0, 2), (p , 2), (p , 2); 〈2〉)
to be a symmetric MSNE, we want the Governor’s best response to be his cut-off strat-
egy, 〈2〉, i.e.
E uG ((p , 2), (p , 2), (p , 2); 〈2〉)≥ E UG ((p , 2), (p , 2), (p , 2); 0)
where
E uG ((p , 2), (p , 2), (p , 2); 〈2〉) = 2p (−a (p −2) +p −1)−3b (p −1)2+1
and
E uG ((p , 2), (p , 2), (p , 2); 0) = 1+2p −3b
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B.1 Statistical Tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics of Treatment 1
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Player ID in Group 3.5 (1.714) 1 6
Participant ID 17 (8.718) 2 30
Round Number 6.5 (3.464) 1 12
Participant Payoff 228.333 (28.92) 200 300
Contribution 86.111 (34.704) 0 100
Group Total Contribution 516.667 (98.945) 200 600
Group Individual Share 206.667 (39.578) 80 240
N 144
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Table B.2: Summary statistics of Treatment 2
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Player ID in Group 3.5 (1.712) 1 6
Participant ID 14.5 (8.507) 1 29
Round Number 6.5 (3.46) 1 12
Participant Payoff 224.444 (35.077) 160 260
Contribution 79.167 (40.706) 0 100
Group Total Contribution 475 (111.751) 200 600
Group Individual Share 190 (44.701) 80 240
N 216
Table B.3: t-test for Treatment 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group Contribution 144 516.6667 5.487147 65.84576 505.8203 527.5131
t = 94.1594
degrees of freedom = 143
p=0.0000
Table B.4: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-tailed test
Treatment obs ranksum expected
1 144 32040 25992
2 432 32940 38988





Figure B.1: MTurk Page
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Figure B.2: Welcome Screen
Figure B.3: General Instruction for all Treatments
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Figure B.4: Treatment 1 instructions
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Figure B.5: Treatment 2 instructions
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Figure B.6: Payment Instructions
Figure B.7: Wait Screen
Figure B.8: Player 1’s screen in Treatment 2
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Figure B.9: Player 2’s screen in Treatment 2
Figure B.10: Player 3’s screen in Treatment 2
